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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STl\TF OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18996

-vGEORGE B. ARCHAMBEAU,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with aggravted
robbery under Utah Code. Ann. Ii> 76-6-302 (19fl2).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of aggravated robbery on September 16, 1982 in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.

On January 18,

1983, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five
years to life in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the verdict and judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF Tl!E Fl\CTS
At l :00 p.m. on Fehruary 'i, 1981, a robher enter.,,!
the south door of the Zion's First National Rank in Murray,
Utah, near Fashion Place Mall.

Dressed in denim blue overull'-

and a light blue windbreaker with a ren ski mask pullen ovr·r
his face (T. 15), the robber carried a sawed-off shotgun (T.
16) to the teller window of Julie terry ( T. 10).

The rohber

told the two clerks to lie on the floor and ordered Julie
terry to give him the money (T. 16).

Julie gave the rohber

approximately $6,000 (T. 24) while activating the bank's
cameras ( T. 14).

After staying in the bank approximately two

minutes (T. 32), the robber left by the south doors (T.
24-25).
Robert Cosaert entered the south doors of the bank
just after 1:00 p.m. and encountered a man coming through the
inner doors (T. 78-79).

The man was dressed darkly with " ski

mask that covered all hut a six inch in diameter oblong area
around his eyes, disclosing the robber's face from the bottom
of his nose to just above the eyebrows (T. RO).

Mr. cosaert

passed within thirteen or fourteen inches of the robber (T.
79-80) for a four or five second view of the eyes ( T. 83).
a man's voice, the robber said "Excuse me" as he passed Mr.
Cosaert (T. 83).
Mr. Cosaert had noticed that the robber was
caucasion, had light-colored eyebrows, and light blue or
grayish eyes (T. 81-82), with distinct crow's feet about his
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Jn

eyes (T. 83).
1J!JSi t

On April 3, lg81 (T. 130), Mr. Crosaert

ively identified a photo of appellant from among six or

seven photos displayed by Detective Robinson of the Murray
1'ity Police (T. 87-88).

At trial, Mr. Cosaert stood at the

same thirteen or fourteen inch distance while appellant wore a
mask and noted the same features of height, weight, eye and
eyebrow-color, and crow's feet around the eyes (T. 85-87).
Annette Cornia was working as a teller and went
downstairs from the main lobby of the bank just before the
rnbbery.

(T. 106-107).

As she descended the first two steps

next to a large window, an individual walked pass the window
on the sidewalk toward the south door of the bank.
118).

The man had blond and wavy shoulrler length hair and

stood between 5'5" and 5'10"
covered

(T. 109,

(T. 110).

His head was not

( T. 109-110) and Ms. Cornia recognized him as someone

who had tried unsuccessfully to cash a check earlier in the
week (T. 114, 120).
Ms. Cornia proceeded down to the basement, returning
to the bank's lobby after approximately two minutes to
discover that a robbery had occured (T. 113).

She was

convinced that she had seen the robber "because when I went
down, there was no one in the bank and I couldn't have been
down there for any amount of time, and when I came back there
was no one there either."

(T. 111).

Ms. Cornia identified

cippellant as the man she had seen in the bank a week prior to
the robbery (T. 121).

At trial, Mr. Cornia stated that the
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color of appellant's hair, the waive> in tlw hair, ancl his
facial profile matchecl that of the man who passecl the wind 0 , 1
just before the robbery.
A search by warrant of appellant's resiclence
procluced a sawed-off rifle, a reel and blue ski mask, pantyhose, a plane ticket in appellant's name from Salt Lake to
Angeles to Honolulu for February of 19Rl (T.

fJJS

letters tc

and from Honolulu between appellant and girl friencls,

four

bullets, along with a checkbook in appellant's name to Zi0n's
First National Bank in Murray (T.

150).

Laureen Fite clatecl appellant cluring February of 192.l
(T. 38).

In February, appellant and Ms.

Fite had a

conversation concerning bank robberies ( T. 40).

Appellant

showed Ms. Fite a picture of a stack of money taken at
appellant's house (T. 44).

On another accasion, appellant

discussed the possibility of Ms. Fite obtaining overalls from
her stepfather (T. 43).

Ms. Fite remembered appellant saying

"that we was going to rob this bank by Fashion Place Mall and
after we robbed it we was going to go into Fashion Place tlall.
We were going to take off the uniforms and pretend we were
buying something
and Paul." T. 43).

He said it had been robbecl before, he
Appellant described their previous robhe0

as having been committed by he and Paul in overalls
nylons and ski masks over their heads (T. 43).
Paul Watson,

The clec-easP•l,

(T. 159) was clescribed by three witnesses as

having dark hair (T. 48, 147, 161) and brown eyes (T. 48).
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Randy Sargent testified that his half-brother, Paul
had call him in the early evening of February 5, 1981
,,nrl daimed
(T.

thut he had robbed a bank and taken about $5,000

159-160).

However, Randy Sargent was not sure of which

bank Paul claimed to have robbed (T. 162).

Paul was later in

Hawaii with appellant (T. 163).
Bill Guy Mourer worked as appellant's crew boss for
Rocky Mountain Communications, a cable-TV line installer (T.
lfiR-lf;'l).

Mr. Mourer testified that appellant never left the

job site on February 5, 1981 (T. 172) and offered appellant's
time card with a date which had been changed from February 6
to February 5 (T. 173).

Although Mr. Mourer remembered first

hearing of appellant's arrest on April 1, 1981,

(T. 173), he

could not remember the exact date when he had corrected
appellant's time card

(T. 17R).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT APPELLANT.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient
evidence presented to convict him of aggravated robbery
because (A) appellant's alibi defense raised a reasonable
riolli•t as to his presence at the robbery, and

(B) the two

identifications are unreliable and insufficient to
suprmrt a conviction.

However, the existence of conflicting

-"i-

evidence does not necessarily warr;irit

Arrcllant's

criticism of the eye-witness irlentif1cations 0oes to the
credibility of their testimony rather than its aclrnic;sihi]i1
viewing the eviclence in the light most favorahle

to thn

]Ut

verdict, the evidence was not so inherently improbable or
inconclusive that reasonable minds could not have reasonahJc
believed that appellant committed the robbery.
The standard of appellate review on insufficient
evidence states that:
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence [viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict] is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt.
State v. Bradford, Utah, 663 P.2d 68, 69 (1983)

(citing State

v. Petree, Utah, 1559 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)); State v. Linrlen,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364 (1983) (per curium).
Mr. Mourer's alibi testimony that appellant was on

,1

job site at the time of the robbery does not necessitate sucl,
a reasonable doubt.

In State v. Linden, Utah, 6'i7 P.2d 1164

(1983), defendant presented three alibi witness placing

defendant in California at the time of the TJtah crime.
1365-66.

Id. at

Still, the conviction was affirmed on appeal beca11s>

the evidence viewecl

in a light favorable

to the vercl ict

included three state witness who placecl defendant in Utah nclf
the time of the crime.

Id

-6-

In the instant case, the state presented two
witness, Mr. Cosaert (T. 77) and Ms. Cornia (T. 106), who
rkscribed the robber and subsequently identified appellant.
q1rl friend,

A

Laureen Fite, related conversations with

appellant about bank rob be ri es and plans to rob a bank ( T.
40).

A gun was found at appellant's residence that matched

descriptions given at the bank hy ,Jule Terry (T. 16) and which
the jury could compare with bank photos of the robber and his
gun (T.

49-50,

R.

96).

Evidence was presented of a trip by

appellant to Hawaii soon after the robbery date (T. 138, 150).
A ski mask and stocking were also found
residence (T. 128).

in appellant's

In contrast, Mr. Mourer's memory was

corroborated only by a time card with a changed date (T. 178).
Mr. Mourere had not testified at the preliminary hearing (T.
180), and had an incentive to protect his job as a supervisor
by exaggerating his constant supervision of appellant.
Further, Mourer could not remember when he corrected
appellant's time card (T.
light favorable

178).

Viewing the evidence in a

to the verdict, Mr. Mourer's testimony was

apparently not so credible to the jury that it must have
raised a reasonable Cloubt in the minds of reasonable jurors.
Nor was Mr. Mourer's testimony so credible as to make the
state's evidence so comparatively inconclusive or inherently
irnprubable as to raise a reasonable doubt.

There was

sufficeint evidence to support the conviction of appellant.

-7-

Appellant also contencls that thP

iclentification hv

Ms. Cosaert and Ms. Cornia were given under conclitions
creating "a substantial likelihood of irrep<'lrahle
identification."

(Appellant's brief

However, th0

factors pointed out hy appellant iffe not so extreme as to
exclude their testimony, but merely reflect on its credil,llit
and were openly ann sufficiently brought to the jury's
attention.
The standard in assessing whether a police
identification procedure denies the accused due process
considers whether "uncler a totality of the circumstances,
are so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparahle
mistake of identification as to deny the accusea a fair
trial."

State v. Mccumber, Utah,

622 P.2n 353, 357 (l<J8n).

Appellant offers no eviclence or argument that the photo arrav
shown to Mr. Cosart was suggestive.

Insteacl, appellant

contends that the observations by Cosart and Cornia were so
brief and limitea as to justify suppression of their
testimony.
On the contrary, the rape victim in Mccumber saw
assailant's face only briefly in a aarkened room immeaiately
after she had been awakenea from sleep.

Id.

Noting this

limited observation, the court still aclmittea her testirnonv:
Such factors, however, although they may
weaken the probative impact of the
evidence offered, ao not manaate
suppression of the eviclence in the name of
due process without some showing that the
identification procedures were themselves
impermissibly suggestive.
-fl-

I cl.

Both Mr. Cosaert and Ms. Cornia
,-,J,sc,rvat ions at short distances,
c1

t t0nt ion.

facial

made their

in full sunlight, with direct

Mr.Crosaet's identification was restricted to

features observed through the opening of the robber's

mask and the robber's height and weight.

'ls. Cornia's

inentitication was specific in describing hair color, hair
wave and facial profile.

Her detailed recognition was

partially aided by a recognition of appellant from a previous
encounter.

There was sufficiently detailed observation by the

two eyewitnesses to warrant the presentation of their
testimony.
The length of their observations and whether either
or both witnesses saw someone other than appellant goes to the
probative value of their testimony and an ultimate issue of
fact.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the verclict, the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support
appellant's conviction.

It was not so inconclusive or

inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertainecl a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt.
supra at 444.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT"S REFUSAL TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S SUGGESTED TELFAIRE INSTRUCTION
WAS PROPER AND WITHING THE COURT'S SOUND
DISCRETION.
Appellant's suggestecl

(T.

225) -jury instruction,,,

the purported vagaries of eyewitness identification (R. 14il1
paraphrases much of the jury ins tr uct ion recommend ea in lln i to,J
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

However,

the trial courts refusal to give appellant's instruction was
within its discretion and not prejudicial to appellant.

rrtah

case law rejects the contention that a Telfaire-type
instruction is mandatory in cases where eyewitness testimony
may be determinative.

Viewing the instruct ions as a whole,

the jury was adequately instructed on the elements of the
offense, the state's burc1en of proof, and
assessing the credibility of witnesses.

the jury's role in
Given the available

corroborative evidence, the weakness of appellant's alibi
evidence, the conclitions of observation, the number of
eyewitnesses ( 2) and the consistency of their ic1entifications,
no Telfaire -

type instruction was required.

Even if there

was error in failing to give the Telfaire instruction, anv
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the facts
of the instant case.
Utah has refused to adopt a rigid rule requirin0 a
Telfair isntruction in all cases where eyewitness testimony
may be dispositive of a defendant's alibi.
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State v. Schaffer,

Utah, 638 P.2d 1185 (1981).
considered as a whole.

Jury instruciton should be

State v. Caffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777

(1977); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 20 414 P.2d 575
(1%6).

Schaffer upheld the trial court's refusal to give a

Telfaire instruction where the jury was adequately instructed
that (1) the state must proveeach element of the offense beyon
a reasonble doubt, ( 2) the jury is the exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses, and (3) the jury must find that
the state has proved beyond a reasonalbe doubt each element of
the charged offense.

Schaffer at 1187.

Utah's refusal to

adopt a rigid rule mandating the Telfaire instruction in all
cases follows the plurality portion among federal district.l
See, State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982)

(dicta at 61:

"We have ot heretofore held that such an instruction is
required.

We believe the giving of it shoulc'l be left to the

discretion of the trial court.").
Jury instruction #3 adequatley explains the State's
burc'len to prove essential allegations beyond a reasonable
doubt ( R. 98).

Further instructions define reasonable doubt

See, e.g., Cullen v. United States, 408 F.2d 1178, 1181
TSfh Cfr. 1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 129,
131-132 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 449 u.s. 855, 101 s.ct.
151, 66 L. Ed.2d 69 (1980)--rfD instruction within
discretion of trial court and need be given only when there
is a danger of misic'lentification due to lack of
corroborative evidence.); United States v. Masterson, 529
P.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Montelbano,
F.2d 56, 59-60 (2nd Cir. 1979). But cf., United
States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (""fr'd Cir. T97IT"; United
States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
United States, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 83, 361 F.2d 537 (1966);
United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975).
-11-

(Instruction #7, R. 101); stress the iury's role as the
exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weiqr,'
of the evidence (Instruction #8, R. 102); and emphasize the
State's burden of proving each element of aggravated robbery
beyond a reasonable doubt (Instruction #12, R. 106).
Instruction #18 (R. 112) explicitly requires the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant
as the perpetrator of the crime.2

Instruction# 19 (R. 1131

raises defendant's alibi defense and relates it to the
reasonable doubt standard.3

Instruction #20 (R. 114) states

clearly that the defendant must present only enough evidence
of his alibi to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt and
defendant need not prove his alibi by a preponderance or
greater evidence.4
Appellant's requested Telfaire instruction (R. 140)
would be redundant on the issues of burden of proof and jury
responsibility for assessing the credibility of the witness's
testimony.5

Appellant is not entitled to a jury instruction

that is repetitive or redundant, or "if it appears that the
giving of the requested instruction would not have affected
the outcome of the trial."

State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d

353, 359 (1980).

2

See Appendix A of Respondent's Brief.

3

See Appendix A of Respondent's Brief.

4

Id.

5

See Appendix B of Respondent's Brief.
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During exaimination of the witnesses, there was
attention focused on the proximity and length of
observation, the lighting conditions, the certainity of the
irlentifications, and the length of time between observation
and identification.

Purther, the State presented

corroborative testimony of conversations between appellant and
a girlfriend about robbing hanks (T. 43) and a photograph seen
by the girlfriend depicting appellant with a stack of money
(T. 44).

The State also introduced an airline ticket to

Hawaii in appellant's name as well as a ski mask, stocking and
gun found at appellant's residence (T. 153) that the jury
could compare with bank photos of the robber (T. 20-24).
Contrary to the confusing evidence in State v.
Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), there are no discrepancies
in the instant case between the identification and earlier
descriptions by eyewitnesses.

This case involves two calm,

objective witnesses whose observations occurred in daylight in
contrast to the Malmrose identification by one sexuallly
assaulted victim at night.

Appellant makes no argument of

suggestive photo arrays as did the Malmrose defendant.
Further, appellant's weak alibi witness also contrasts with
the substantial corroboration of the alibi in Malmrose.
This case does not so delicately hinge on the
vagaries of eyewitness identifiction that a Telfaire
instruction must have been given to insure a fair trial.
purported hazards of eyewitness testimony are not acutely

-13-

The

present in these identifications.

Ms. Cornia recognizecl

appellant from a previous encounter.

The observations by ,>ilcc.

witness were in gooc1 light, at close c1istanceoc;, and form nnL
part of a case that incluc1es substantial corroborative
evidence.
No benefit would have followed from instructin'J th•
jury on the nuances of visual perceptions, or esoteric
distinctions on types of memory.
needed.

No Telfaire instruction

wac

Even if appellant's instruction should have been

given, any error in failing to give it would be harmless
beyond a reasonable c1oubt in that giving the requestec1
instruction would not have affected the verdict in light of
the overwhelming evidence against appellant.

State v.

Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980); State v. Bell, Utah, 563
P.2d 186 (1977).

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appellant hac1 a right to the effective assistance nf
counsel under the United States and Utah Constitutions.
Const. art. VI anc1 XIV, Utah Const. art 1

<>

12.

l'.S.

Appellant

contenc1s that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because counsel failec1 to subpoena additional witnesses to
testify (a) as to appellant's alibi, and

(b) as to staternentc

by the deceased Paul Watson admitting Watson's commission ut

-14-

the February 5 robbery.

However, appellant fails to carry his

burden of establishing the ineffectiveness of counsel.
<ounsel's failure to call additional witnesses was within
counsel's legitimate legal judgment of trial tactics or
strategy.
Appellant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel entitles him to "the assistance of a competent member
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with
lhe interest of the accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent with the ethcs of the
profession."

Codianna v. Mooris, Utah, 660 P.ed 1101 (1983)

(quoting State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.ed 203, 204, (1976) ).
Appellant has the burden of establishing inadequate
representation by proof that is "a demonstrable reality and
not a speculative matter."
56, 58 (1982).

State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d

Legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial

tactics or strategy is not ineffective counsel even if the
judgment appears unwise in retrospect.

Codianna at 1109.

Finally, "it must appear that any deficiency in the
performance of counsel was prejudicial."

Id.

Error is

prejudicial only if appellant shows a "reasonable likelihood
that there would have been a different result" without
counsel's error.

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (1979).

Appellant's claim of error is speculative rather
than a demonstrable reality.

Counsel for appellant called

appellant's boss, Bill Guy Mourer, to testify as to
appellant's alibi that he was at work during the robbery.
(T.

167).

There is no evidence in the record that other
-15-

members of the work crew were locatable for subpoena,
have corroborated Mourer's testimony, or would have been as
credible as the boss.

Similarly, there is no evidence in rt,

record that addition al witnesses other than Randy Sargent
heard confessions of the deceased Paul Watson, that the iuq
would have believed such witnesses, or even that the jury
would have been more inclined to believe Watson's statements
than the evidence presented against appellant.
Appellant's decision not to subpoena additional
witnesses was within counsel's legitimate judgment of trial
strategy even if such witnesses were available.

The expense

of additional subpoenas, the time needed to present their
testimony, or counsel's assessment of their credibility may
have effected counsel's strategy.

Even if hindsight questions

that strategy because the jury rejected appellant's alibi
and/or failed to believe that Paul Watson committed the
robbery,

unwise choices of strategy do not constitute

ineffective counsel.

McMann v. Richardson,

397 U.S. 759

( 1970).
Finally, any deficiency in the performance of
counsel ws not prejudicial in the sense of there being a
reasonable likelihood of a different result without the error.
The testimony of additional witnesses would still have
weighed against the State's evidence of two eyewitnesses,
statements by appellant to his girlfriend and her testimon\'
regarding a photograph of money, a trip by appellant to Hawaii

-16-

shortly after the robbery, and physical evidence found at
appellant's residence that the jury could compare with bank
photos.

There is no likelihood of a different result given

thP strength of

the State's case.

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict appellant.
appellant.

Two witnesses at the bank identified

There was also corroborative physical evidence

introduced, as well as testimony concerning conversations
between appellant and his girlfriend about bank robberies
committed by appellant.

Appellant's sole alibi witness was

simply not as credible as the sufficient evidence against
appellant.
The trial court's refusal to give appellant's
suggested instruction or eyewitness identification testimony
was proper and within the court's sound discretion.

The

Telfaire instruction is not required under Utah case law and
not needed in the instant case.
Appellant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel.

Counsel's failure to call additional witnesses was

within his proper judgment of trial strategy and tactics.

Any

supposed harm from such failure is purely speculative.
This Court should affirm appellant's conviction of
aqqravated robbery.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this_!__!}____ clay of November,
1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORITJS
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact

copy

of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to
Tyrone E. Medley, 311 South State Street, Ste 280, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, the J...Q:l:i_day of November, 1983.
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO.

lb

One of the questions raised in this case was the identification
,,r rhe defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.

d

t\ll'

The identity

defendant is an element of the offense and the StElte

h;is the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

1his means that you, the jury, must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable
i·'uh' ,

)f the accuracy of the identification of the defendant

I"· f, ·" vou may find him guilty of any offense.

If you are not

, ,., ''need beyond a i:easonable doubt that the defend.ont 1Jas the

r er 00n ·.>Jho committed the er ime then you must find the de

INSTRUCTION NO.

Iq

The defendant has raised the defense of alibi.
The defendant in this case has introduced evidence tending
to show that he was not present at the time and place of
the commission of the alleged offense for which he is here
rn trial.

If, after a consideration of all the evidence,

you ha"e a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present
at the

the crime was committed, he is entitled to an

INSTRUCTION NO.

:

(;,/--

You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not
T'i' r_· a defendant to establish the defense of alibi by
prce" 11r1crance or greater weight of evidence.

The laws

of u•.·all require the defendant to bring forward some
e _1 cil'n 'e

which tends to show that he was not present at the

rime and place of the commission of the alleged offense.
: f the di:fendant has done this, and if such evidence when

r'nsidE Pd in connection with all other evidence in this
osc raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
"Ou

m.•,-l acquit him c·f the offense charged in the Information.

APPENDIX B

____µ.____

INSTRUCTION NO.

Identification testimony is an expression of belief
or impression by the witness.

In this case its value depends

the opportunity the witness had to observe whether
not the defendant was the person who took personal property
in the possession of Julie Terry on February 5, 1981, and

to make a realiable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a
witness, you should consider the fol lowing:
Cl>

Are you convinced that the witness had the

capacity and an adequate opportunity to bserve the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity
to obser the person at the time will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far
or close the witness was from the offender how good were
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion
to see or know the person in the past.
(2)

Are you satisfied that the identification

made by that witness subsequent to the event was a product
of his or her own recollection?

You may take into account

both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances
under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been

influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant
presented to her for identification, you should scrutinize
the identification with great care.

You may also consider

the length Of time that lapsed between the occurrence of
the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to
defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the
identification.

